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Abstract— The term ‘steganography’ encapsulates the 
practice of secretly embedding data into digital mediums 
including video, image and audio files.  Although steganography 
is often associated with nefarious activities, conceptually it asserts 
several characteristics that render it useful in contemporary 
security applications.  Not just a mechanism for criminals to 
communicate secret information over a digital channel, 
steganography is also used as a legitimate method of ensuring 
integrity of digital media artefacts and for identification of same.  
This application of steganography allows for identification 
images storing additional information to verify both the identity 
of the subject as well as the authenticity of the image. 
Developed methods of steganography invoke various spatial 
domain techniques that are successful in covertly concealing data 
within ‘innocent’ carrier images.  The techniques include linear 
methods such as those which replace the least significant bit 
(LSB) of the bytes in an image and frequency domain methods 
including discrete cosine transform (DCT), discrete wavelet 
transform (DWT) and discrete Fourier transform (DFT).  The 
success of a steganographic algorithm is hinged on the method’s 
ability to successfully embed data, so that the data remains 
concealed within a carrier image; and also to successfully extract 
the same data uncorrupted.  Often modern image coding formats 
include lossy compression in the frequency domain; this can 
result in data loss, corruption and noise within the image when 
carrier images are re-encoded.  To ensure data extraction is 
successful, error correction functions must be invoked to 
counteract noise and ensure embedded data is extracted without 
any loss or corruption. 
In exploring steganographic software, the functionality and 
reliability of a novel steganographic application ‘Intelligent 
Identity Authenticator’ (IIA) was assessed.  IIA invokes the use of 
steganography to conceal real-time identity information within 
images on identity cards.  The functionality of IIA is based on a 
unique algorithm that utilizes DWT to embed a string of 
characters within an identity image.  When data is extracted, it 
provides a link to further documentation relating to the data 
subject, allowing for verification of the claimant’s identity and 
authenticity of the identity card. 
The embedding and extraction functions executed by IIA 
were found to be mostly reliable, except where data had been 
embedded within a carrier image that was characterized by a 
large proportion of black pixels.  In these cases, the extracted 
data string experienced significant loss and corruption, thus 
preventing access to the identity verification documentation.  
This paper explores the potential cause of this specific corruption 
and discusses extensive testing conducted on control images.  The 
results are analysed to identify an improved solution that could 
rectify the issue, with an aim to improving both the functionality 
and reliability of the IIA system. 
Keywords—steganography; image processing; noise; error-
correction; authentication 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. Identity Theft and IdentityVerification 
Advancements in technology and increased dependence on 
digital sharing of information have presented challenges in 
protecting the integrity, confidentiality and availability of 
personal data [1].  One such challenge is the rise in identity 
theft, where perpetrators use the identities of others for 
nefarious purposes and essentially to violate the law [2].  
Identity theft is “…the misuse of another individual’s personal 
information to commit fraud” [3] and generally occurs in two 
stages; illegally obtaining personal information relating to the 
identity of an individual and using this information to create a 
fake identity through false or fraudulent documentation [4].   
Counterfeit identity cards have become increasingly 
commonplace, thus, authentication and verification of identity 
documentation has become a salient issue with the surge in 
incidents of identity theft [5].  When individuals identify 
themselves, they are making a claim of identity based on a 
variety of different credentials including name, birthdate, 
birthplace, address, education and professional information, 
amongst others.  However, these claims alone do not 
authenticate identity; supportive evidence is required to verify 
that the identification document and the information contained 
therein are valid and the identity of the individual is verified 
[6].  To counteract counterfeit documentation, theft resistant 
authentication mechanisms must be built into identity cards to 
prove the identity assertions that are made, and to protect the 
true and legitimate identity [5]. 
To achieve this end, industry invokes various types of 
security and verification features within identity cards ranging 
from tamper-proof laminates to holograms and more advanced 
features such as ultraviolet ink and microprint [7][8][9][10].  
Although these features verify the authenticity of the card 
itself, they do not verify the identity presented on the card.  To 
do so would require the card to link to a real-time central 
repository that verifies the individual is authorized to possess 
the identity card itself, thus verifying the link between the card 
and the card-holder [11]. 
B. Authentication via Steganographic Techniques 
Steganography is the practice of secretly embedding data 
into a digital medium referred to as a ‘carrier’ [12]. An 
effective steganographic scheme should possess the following 
desired characteristics: 
   Secrecy: The hidden data cannot be extracted from the 
 carrier image without use of a specialist algorithm or 
 tool, in addition to knowledge of a secret key [13][14]. 
  Imperceptibility: Embedded data should remain covert 
 with no discernible changes to the carrier image [13]. 
  High capacity: The carrier image should be capable of 
 embedding a large amount of data [13]. 
   Resistance: The embedded data should be robust and 
 capable of carrier image changes such as lossy 
 compression and cropping [13].  
  Accurate extraction: Extracted data should be intact,  
 suffering no loss or corruption [13]. 
If the aforementioned criteria are met, the use of 
steganography in identification cards presents the potential 
capacity to verify the identity of the individual and also the 
authenticity of the card itself.   
A proven steganographic application called IIA was 
examined for functionality and reliability.  The application 
operates by embedding data in the form of a filename and link 
into identification images.  Upon data extraction, the link 
provides access to a real-time central digital repository.  The 
repository contains documentation that verifies and 
authenticates the identity card detail.   
Extraction failures experienced in initial tests conducted on 
IIA indicated that the application initially failed to meet the 
aforementioned criteria.  In its current form, IIA would not be 
considered a viable solution for intelligent identity 
authentication unless the embedded data was successfully 
extracted with each use.  This paper explores the functionality 
and reliability issues that were encountered when the scheme 
was employed.  It aims to identify the cause of the malfunction 
and offer potential solutions that will result in a fully 
functional, reliable and effective scheme that allows the 
application to operate successfully as an intelligent identity 
authenticator. 
II. BACKGROUND 
This section provides a background for the concepts 
associated with identity authentication and the features that 
support it.  It also gives a brief explanation of various methods 
of steganography including affiliated topics such as colour 
models, image noise and error correction functions.  Lastly, it 
provides an outline of the core functionality of IIA and the 
challenges that were encountered when invoking the 
application to embed verification data into identity images.  
Collectively, these explorations justify the extensive tests that 
were conducted in a bid to identify the origin of corrupted 
extractions.  
A. Identity Cards: Security Levels & Features 
Fraudulent identities and their supporting documentation 
are much coveted by individuals and groups who wish to 
commit various types of crime.  In an attempt to suppress the 
ability of such parties from successfully producing counterfeit 
identity cards that appear realistic and thus verify false or 
stolen identities, various security features are incorporated into 
modern identity cards.  These features seek to verify the 
authenticity of the card and confirm the identity of its holder is 
real and the detail is correct.  Security features are often 
included in both commercially marketed and 
official/government issued identification cards in a bid to 
stamp out fraudulent documentation.  Table I describes the 
levels of security, the essential attributes at each level and also 
provides examples of the features each encompasses 
[10][15][16][17].  
Table I. Identification Document Security Features 
Security Level Attributes Examples 
Level 1: Overt 
 Basic requirement 
 Lowest level security 
 Visual verification via 
discernable features 
 Overtly printed features 
 Characterised by 
method of production 
 Physical additives to 
card substrate and 
laminate 
 Visible watermarks 
 Holograms 
 Security designs 
 Fine printing 
 Fibres 
 Security laminates 
 Overt biographic data 
 Embossed ridges 
Level 2: Covert 
 Compliment level 1 
features 
 Not readily perceivable  
 Requires basic specialist 
tools to capture, register 
and authenticate data 
(lighting, magnification) 
 Smart chips 
 Contactless chips 
 Magnetic Stripes 
 Radio Frequency  ID 
 UV Ink 
 Microprinting 
Level 3: Forensic 
 Optimum security 
 Complex & Specialized 
 Visually perceivable 
data combined with 
secret data 
 Requires specialist 
forensic tools to capture, 
register and authenticate 
data (unique algorithms)  
 Optimal schemes link to 
a real-time digital 
central repository to 
verify and expand on 
overt/covert detail 
 Steganography 
 Barcodes 
  Qode,  
 QR Code  
  Nexcode 
 SecureText™ 
 
In combination, features from these levels provide a 
comprehensive assurance of validity and authenticity of 
identification cards and related documents.  The categorised 
features are incorporated to protect identity information on 
crucial documents to ensure originality and accuracy of the 
identities they represent [15].   
Level 1 (overt) security features provide the advantage of a 
simple and swift cursory visual verification of identity 
information and document authenticity without specialist tools, 
these features are easily tampered with or copied.  [15]. 
However, these features alone do not provide adequate 
security; advancements in commercially available card 
production equipment have facilitated improved fraudulent 
replication. 
Level 2 (covert) security features theoretically prevent 
alteration to the data concealed within the identity card [15].  
The data capacity of each mechanism is constrained by the 
feature’s memory size and technical capabilities [10].  Recent 
technological advancements have resulted in breaches of these 
features and as such may no longer be considered entirely 
secure.  
Level 3 (forensic) security features provide security and 
integrity of information from a surface level to that which is 
infinitely complex and specialized [15].  They facilitate 
centralised and forensic security controls which are applied in 
combination with localised and limited security features 
[15][16].  Centrally retrieved original data can reveal 
discrepancies in documentation and expose those that are 
fraudulent.  Forensic features have been endorsed by the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the 
United Nation Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking 
(UN.GIFT) [11][18].  The Vienna 2008 Forum ratified that 
various machine readable code implementations are difficult to 
falsify due to a central and protected source database with 
appropriate access authorisation implementations (Article 12, 
Legislative Guide for the Implementation of the Protocol to 
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Tracking in Persons) [18].   
Examination of identity document security features has 
categorized the function offered by IIA as a forensic feature. 
The embedded data is concealed from plain sight, requires a 
special digital tool/algorithm to extract and connects to a 
central repository that verifies and expands upon the 
information that is overtly displayed on the identification card. 
B. Color Space Models 
A color space model is an abstract mathematical model 
which simply describes the range of colors as tuples of 3 or 4 
values or color components. Each color space is an elaboration 
of the coordinate system and sub-space, where every color in 
the system is represented by a single dot known as a pixel.  A 
typical example is the Red Green Blue (RGB) model, currently 
the most popular implementation as it is compatible with 
common image file formats such as Graphics Interchange 
Format (GIF), Portable Network Graphics (PNG) and Joint 
Photographic Experts Group (JPG).  RGB assigns a value 
between 0 and 255 to each of the red, green and blue bytes that 
define each pixel. In this model 0 is the darkest and 255 is the 
lightest, thus the combination of values produces a specified 
colour.  With this model R=0,G=0,B=0 produces black and 
R=255,G=255,B=255 produces white.  
Alternate colour space models are also available, these 
include Cyan, Magenta, Yellow and Key (CMYK), and YCbCr, 
where Y is the luma component, Cb is the blue-difference 
chroma component and Cr is the red-difference chroma 
component.  Often to invoke complex steganographic 
techniques, the original colour space model of an image may 
need to be converted one or more times to embed data.  This is 
achieved by applying specific mathematical functions to pixel 
byte values. 
C. Steganographic Techniques 
Various forms of steganography have been invoked for 
thousands of years, where information and ‘secrets’ are hidden 
in plain sight.  In the digital era, steganographic techniques 
have adapted to utilize digital mediums such as audio, video 
and images.  In image steganography, data can be stored in the 
form of ASCII code at binary level in carrier images.  Pixel 
byte values that define colour and luminance are manipulated 
to store binary representations of the secret message data bit by 
bit.  
One of the simplest steganographic techniques is the LSB 
method where the smallest bit (value of 1) of the red, green or 
blue byte is altered to store the necessary value (1 or 0).  This 
has no perceivable impact on the colour or intensity of the 
image [19].  This method can be further extended to alter the 
values of all the bytes, or utilize a random number generator to 
randomly distribute alternate bit values, rather than operating in 
a sequential linear manner [20]. 
Frequency domain techniques such as DCT and DWT 
involve significantly more complex processing to embed data.  
In the frequency domain, bit representations of information can 
be inserted into coefficients of image transforms such as DFT, 
DCT and DWT [19].  These techniques have proven to be 
more robust for embedding data, especially when the carrier 
image undergoes common processing operations and lossy 
compression [20]. 
The rate of change in pixel values across an image defines 
the spatial frequency.  The frequency domain identifies how 
much the average colour values alter from one pixel to the 
next.  This allows images to be represented as complex waves 
that can be decomposed into standard waves of different 
frequencies. Coefficients are the weightings assigned to 
standard waves depending on their contribution to complex 
waves [20]. 
High spatial frequency is described as the areas of an image 
in which the colour varies rapidly.  Low frequencies are 
described as areas where there is no variation.  The different 
frequencies are overlaid to produce an image and the frequency 
coefficients are used to determine the strength of a particular 
frequency in a specific section of the image [19].  This allows 
for separation and removal of information that is high 
frequency and beyond human perception.  Frequency 
components with minimal coefficients are discarded, leaving 
only the significant contributors to the image [20].  DCT 
transforms pixel values representing the spatial domain into 
representations in the frequency domain.  This can be executed 
repeatedly with an objective of compressing image data so it 
can be stored or transmitted and later decompressed to reform 
the original image [19].   
DWT is any wavelet transform for which the wavelets are 
discretely sampled. Wavelet transforms are based on small 
waves of varying frequency and limited duration.  The Haar 
DWT transform uses square waves to approximate an original 
function.  The pixels are scanned in two operations; 
horizontally and vertically where addition and subtraction 
functions are performed on neighboring pixels. Sums and 
differences from each scan are stored on the left and right 
respectively (horizontal scan), and the top and bottom 
respectively (vertical scan).  The pixel sums represent the low 
frequency element (L), while the pixel differences represent the 
original high frequency element (H).   The result is 4 sub-bands 
denoted as LL, HL, LH, and HH.  As depicted in Figure 1, the 
process can be reiterated to produce additional sub-bands.  The 
LL sub-band appears most similar to the original image [19].   
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. DWT Sub-bands 
D. Image Noise 
Digital images are prone to a variety of noise types, where a 
pixel does not match those surrounding it.  Image noise is often 
the source of distortion or poor quality images and can be 
introduced in several ways dependent on the invoked image 
creation technique [21].  Various types of noise produce 
distortion as described in Table II [22].  
Table II. Types of Image Noise 
Noise Type Result Appearance 
Photoelectronic  Photon Noise  Thermal Noise  Granular Appearance 
Impulse 
 Salt Noise 
 Pepper Noise 
 Line Drop 
 White Speckles 
 Black Speckles 
 Black Lines 
 
Noise Type Result Appearance 
Structured 
 Periodic, Stationary 
 Periodic, Nonstationary 
 Aperiodic 
 Detector Striping 
 Detector Banding 
 Phased Repetitive 
Lines 
 Appearance of Ridges 
 Stripes 
 Pixelated Appearance 
 
E. Error Correction Functions 
Modern image coding formats often include lossy 
compression in the frequency domain where data beyond 
human perception is discarded to reduce the size of the digital 
file.  A chief characteristic of an effective steganographic 
technique is the ability to maintain the integrity of data stored 
in a carrier file, even if that file is subject to filtering, 
resampling, cropping, or lossy compression.   Often re-
encoding following these processes results in lost and 
corrupted data where bits in the embedded data string are 
deleted, replaced and inserted [23].  
Data is transmitted in a bit-stream over channels where the 
presence of noise is common. The noise may alter messages 
causing the received message to differ significantly from that 
which was originally sent, resulting in low reliability [25]. 
Coding theory addresses the altered result of data transmitted 
across a noisy channel, and aims improve reliability by 
converting error-ridden received messages back to their 
original error-free form [24].    
F. Operation of Intelligent Identity Authenticator 
Examination of the IIA algorithm revealed that the 
application embeds secret data in identity card imagery by 
executing the following sequence of steps: 
The application accepts user input arguments in the form of 
a potential carrier image file (PNG or JPG) and a PDF file that 
documents a subject’s personal information.   The carrier file 
and PDF documents are stored in a remote digital central 
repository.  The carrier image is processed by converting the 
RGB model to the YCbCr model using a pre-defined 
mathematical equation.  DWT is invoked to split the colour 
planes into Y, Cb and Cr.  The link to the PDF document is 
converted to a binary string and embedded in lower left hand 
corner of the Y plane of the image.   
To extract the embedded data, the same process is reversed, 
with an additional step for error-correction.  When the link to 
verification documentation is successfully extracted, the central 
digital repository is accessed and the supporting PDF 
documentation may be viewed.   
G. Functionctionality & Reliability Testing 
Basic-level functionality and reliability tests were 
conducted to ensure IIA operated effectively.  This testing 
resulted in a large number of failed extractions.  In a bid to 
ascertain the source of the failures, further simple tests were 
conducted.  Analysis of results identified basic system 
requirements such as document compatibility and filename 
attributes and length.  Correct processing of input documents 
only occurred with PNG or JPG formats and filenames twelve 
characters in length.  Subsequent tests adhered to the 
aforementioned conditions and although the rate of failure was 
significantly reduced, the system still experienced a substantial 
number of unexplained extraction failures.  
With consideration for the defined effective steganographic 
scheme criteria, it was concluded that IIA could not be 
considered functional or reliable and hence was not an effective 
scheme. During the later tests it was observed that specific 
images resulted in failed extractions.  On closer inspection, it 
was identified that problematic image files all shared a 
common characteristic in that they all contained a large amount 
of black. 
Based on this premise, it was hypothesized that excess 
black pixels may causing the unexplained extracted failures.  
Consequentially, subsequent tests were focused on images that 
were comprised of large black pixel blocks.  As depicted in 
Figure 2, custom images were created to include large areas of 
black pixels in specific areas of carrier images.   
 
 
   
Fig. 2. Various testing positions of large blocks of black pixels 
These tests resulted in two observations; large amounts of 
black pixels indisputably resulted on corrupted data 
extractions and the specific problematic area was the lower 
left hand corner of the image.  While extractions from images 
b1q, b2q and b4q (depicted in Figure 2) were successful, all 
attempted extractions from image b3q, also referred to as the 
third quadrant, resulted in a corrupted data string.  Figure 3 
pinpoints the location of each of the quadrants. 
 
Fig. 3. Defined Image quadrants 
It was suspected that the third quadrant may be the area of 
the carrier image where IIA embedded data. Inspection of the 
IIA source code confirmed this hypothesis, thus providing 
explanation for the difficulty experienced with this specific 
area of the carrier image.  However, this discovery did not 
reveal why this complication was explicitly confined to pixels 
that were black, having an RGB value of (0,0,0).  
Corruption of the embedded data caused by excess black 
pixels in the third quadrant had the potential to render IIA 
useless an as effective steganographic scheme for intelligent 
identity authentication as often identity images depict 
individuals wearing black. In such cases this would result in the 
inclusion of large amounts of black pixels in the third quadrant.  
These results prompted further in depth testing with an aim to 
identify the root cause and potentially identify a viable solution 
to improve the functionality and reliability of IIA, so that it 
may be considered an effective steganographic scheme. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
This section describes the testing methods invoked to assess 
the extent of the impact of black pixels in the third quadrant.   
A. Black Pixel TestingMethodology 
Due to corrupted data extractions, IIA was unable to meet 
defined functional requirements, as the system was attempting 
to access the digital central repository with erroneous links.  
Tests had concluded that the redundant links experienced 
character omissions and replacements; furthermore, in extreme 
cases, no data was extracted at all.   Identification of the 
extraction difficulties associated with black pixels located in 
the third quadrant warranted further examination of the 
steganographic algorithm and concentrated testing.  A plan was 
formulated to conduct the following tests: 
 Colour Testing: Assess if large blocks of alternate colours 
in the third quadrant also resulted in failed extractions. 
 Gradual Black Pixel Increase Testing: Assess the 
algorithm’s tolerance of black pixels within the third 
quadrant.  Aim to identify specific rows and columns where 
black pixels become problematic.  Potentially identify an 
acceptable ratio of black pixels. 
 Almost Black Pixel Testing:  Assess if large blocks of 
almost black pixels (R=1,G=1,B=1) also negatively impact 
the extraction process. 
 Link Corruption Testing: Convert data strings to binary 
representations to identify any patterns of corruption 
present in the extractions,  inclusive of data string position, 
corruption type and consistent character replacements. 
B. Image Building 
To allow for controlled testing and detailed inspection of 
image attributes and data string corruption, a custom Java 
application was developed to construct images.  This 
application was designed to conduct the following: 
 Construct images with desired black/colour dispersion   
 Identify the total number of pixels in an image 
 Identify the black pixel count and coordinates  
 Calculate the percentage of black pixels 
 
C. Filename Strings 
To aid identification of data corruption patterns, PDF 
documents were renamed with strings such as 
0123456789ab.pdf and abcdefghijkl.pdf where the original 
string position of characters could be easily ascertained. This 
would simplify result comparison and analysis when testing 
was concluded.   
IV. RESULTS 
This section describes the results of extensive testing 
previously discussed in Section III. 
A. Colour Testing 
Control images were constructed that constituted pixels 
with identical RGB values.  The colours chosen for testing 
were black, white, orange and dark grey.   The results in Table 
III clearly establish that excess black pixels exclusively result 
in extraction failures. All extraction attempts using alternate 
colours were successfully executed. 
Table III. Colour Testing 
Pixel Colour Successful Extraction 
Black  
White  
Orange  
Dark Grey  
 
B. Gradual Black Pixel Increase Testing 
A series of control images were constructed that initially 
consisted of a small block of black pixels in the third quadrant 
that did not impact on the successful extraction of the 
embedded data string.  Each subsequent image increased the 
black pixel count by increments of 100,000.  As depicted in 
Table IV, with each increment, the number of characters that 
were correctly extracted in the correct position was reduced, 
eventually resulting in no successful extraction of any 
embedded characters. 
Table IV. Correct Character Extraction 
Black Pixel  
Count Correct Character Extraction 
15000 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
115000 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
215000 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
315000 5 6 6 5 5 6 5 6 
415000 5 3 4 4 5 5 3 4 
515000 4 2 3 1 4 3 2 1 
615000 4 0 2 1 4 2 2 1 
715000 3 0 1 0 2 1 1 0 
815000 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
915000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
C. Almost Black Pixels 
Images with identical pixel counts to those above were 
constructed; however, instead of defining the pixel values as 
black (R=0,G=0,B=0), the values were defined as ‘almost 
black (R=1,G=1,B=1).  Tests conducted on these images 
resulted in continued successful extractions, where the ‘almost 
black’ pixels were continually incremented until they filled the 
entire image.  The minor manipulation of the pixel byte values 
successfully altered functionality of the steganographic 
algorithm. 
D. Extracted String Degradation 
The original and extracted data strings were converted to 
binary representations in order to assess if any consistent 
patterns of degradation could be identified.  Each character 
was converted to an eight bit byte, resulting in ninety-six bits 
for each twelve character string.  This testing included 
analysis of the position of bits that were commonly altered 
with each increase in the number black pixels.  The results 
conclusively identified that near identical bit positions were 
suffering alteration with each increased black pixel increment.  
Clear patterns were identified where the original link began to 
degrade at binary level, continuing with the alteration of more 
bits until eventually the original bit string was unrecognizable 
when compared to that which was extracted.  To summarise, 
the results of this testing confirmed that the excess black 
pixels in the third quadrant were causing individual bits to be 
converted from 0 to 1 or vice versa.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The results allowed for the establishment of two hypothesis: 
 
1. The IIA steganographic algorithm identified excess black 
pixels in the third quadrant as ‘noise’. 
2. The invoked error-correction function within the 
algorithm was over-compensating for the excess black 
pixels and thus, over-correcting at binary level. 
 
These conclusions indicated that the error-correction function 
invoked was incompatible with this type of steganographic 
method.  Whilst the error-correction function was over-
compensating for black pixel noise, IIA could not be 
considered an effective steganographic scheme that would 
allow for intelligent identity authentication. 
 
The ‘Almost Black’ pixel testing that had been conducted 
illuminated a swift and easy solution to the data string 
corruption issue.  The steganographic algorithm was altered to 
convert all black (R=0,G=0,B=0) pixels within the image to 
almost black (R=1,G=1,B=1) pixels prior to embedding of the 
data string.  This resulted in no visually perceivable alteration 
to the image.  Subsequent tests confirmed that all images 
allowed for successful extraction of embedded data without 
corruption.  This allowed for IIA to meet the criteria required 
and be considered ‘an effective steganographic scheme’. 
 
Further work will include experimentation on alternative 
error-correction functions with IIA; to assess and identify 
types of error correction functions which are most appropriate 
for varying types of steganographic techniques. 
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